ISBN: Ostalo
Godina izdanja: 2007.
Autor: Domaći
Jezik: Engleski

Cognitive Dynamics and Cognitive Significance / Vojislav Božičković


Beograd 2007. Mek povez sa klapnama, engleski jezik, 199 strana.
Knjiga je nekorišćena (nova).
V2


This book deals with the problem of belief retention concerning spatio temporal particulars as well as places and days. It is centred around Frege’s famous ‘today’/ ‘yesterday’ claim which has created a lot of controversy as to whether his remarks about indexicals can be accommodated by his general sense/reference framework. The author argues that it can and that in the indexical case Frege has embraced a different sense/reference framework from the one associated with the non-indexical expressions such as definite descriptions. In line with this, a solution to the problem of cognitive dynamics concerning belief retention is extracted from Frege. It is shown that it can help us solve the case of Rip Van Winkle who has slept for twenty years and woke up thinking he slept for only one day, which David Kaplan found insoluble.

Having earned his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Melbourne, Vojislav Bozičković had full-time lecturing positions at The University of Tasmania and Macquarie University and is currently professor of philosophy at the University of Belgrade. He is the author of Demonstrative Sense (1995). His recent publications have appeared in Philosophical Psychology and in The Blackwell Companion to Schopenhauer.


Sadržaj:
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. Frege’s Retention Claim
2. Three Other Fregean Claims
3. The Kaplan-Perry Response
4. Character and Cognitive Value
Notes
I Cognitive Significance
1.1 The Notion of Cognitive Significance
1.2 Against a Coarse Grained Notion of Cognitive Significance
1.3 The True Bearers of Cognitive Significance
1.4 Knowing the Truth Conditions
Notes
II Cognitive Dynamics and Cognitive Significance
2.1 The Problem of Cognitive Dynamics
2.2 The Rip Van Winkle Case
2.3 The Fourfold Mismatch between Characters and Belief States
2.4 The Retention of Thought
2.5 Individuating Cognitively Significant Mental States
2.6 The Intuitive Criterion of Difference and Putative Objections to it
2.7 Cognitive Content and Truth-Conditional Content
Notes
III Thoughts as Object-Dependent
3.1 Thinking about Objects: the Case of Memory
3.2 Frege and Object-Dependent Thoughts
3.3 Frege and the Problem of Belief Retention
3.4 Second-Order Thoughts
3.5 Narrow vs. Broad Psychological States
3.6 An Attempted Middle Course
3.7 Representationalism vs. Inferentialism
Notes
IV Misidentification and Keeping Track of Objects
4.1 Misidentification of Objects
4.2 Tracking Places, Days, and Objects
Notes
V Thought and the External World
5.1 Human Body and Perception
5.2 Externalism About Knowledge and Justification
5.3 Ignorance of the World and Ignorance of Our Mental States
Notes
References
Index