ISBN: Ostalo
Godina izdanja: .
Jezik: Engleski
Autor: Strani

Cambridge University Press
232 STR

Professor Wisdom gives an elementary introduction to the applications in philosophy of the analytical method. He believes that the aim of analysis is clarity, whereas the aim of speculative philosophy is truth. After a brief introduction on what analysis is, he discusses the relation of body and mind and seeks for causal relations between mental and material events. He concludes this section with a chapter on Free will, before turning to perception and the external world.

Arthur John Terence Dibben Wisdom (1904-1993) was a British philosopher who was, for most of his career, Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge University. (Near the end of his career he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oregon.)

He wrote in the Preface to this 1934 book, “In this book an attempt is made to give an elementary but not too inaccurate introduction to the applications in philosophy of what is now sometimes called the analytic method. This might have been done by explaining the nature of analysis, but here little is said ABOUT analysis and instead elementary examples of its USE are given. Foolishly, perhaps, but only occasionally, the bearing of the analysis upon certain speculative theories has been suggested.”

He explains in the Introduction, “the analytic philosopher, unlike the scientist is not one who learns new truths, but one who gains new insights into old truths. In a sense, philosophy cannot be taught… However, philosophers can be made. They can be made in two ways, namely by practice and by precept… In this book I shall rely almost wholly upon the first method. My performance will (I trust) give the reader some idea of what the goal of the analytic philosopher is and how it is reached. I can… say here and now that (i) the goal of the analytic philosopher is insight into facts; and that (ii) insight is clear apprehension of the ultimate structure of facts; and that (iii) the structure of a fact is clearly apprehended when one apprehends clearly the form, the elements, and the arrangement of the elements of that fact.” (Pg. 2-3)

He summarizes, “The tasks of the historian and the scientist are to some extent interdependent. The historian cannot provide his explanations of particular facts without the scientist’s laws; the scientist may find the historian’s story of the order of particular facts suggestive of universal facts; and the test of the scientist’s suggestions as to what are the laws of nature is their success in predicting the course of nature, that is, the sequence of particular facts.” (Pg. 9-10)

He observes, “I this book the word ‘fact’ will be used often, but in no unusual way, so that it will not be a source of difficulty… I do not attempt to define ‘fact.’ I describe a fact as what a sentence expresses.” (Pg. 20-21)

He notes, “Amongst the many relations between matter and mind there are two which we shall study in this book: first the relation of ownership, and second the relation of knowledge. A mind is a cluster of mental facts which are all about the same thing. A material thing is a cluster of material facts which are all facts about the same thing. Each mind OWNS in a special sense one material thing, namely its body. And each mind knows by perception and in other ways a great many material things. It is with the analysis of these relations that we shall now concern ourselves.” (Pg. 33)

He states, “We do not know for certain that there is not a universal association of mental and material events. Indeed, it is very difficult to draw the line between those material events which are accompanied by consciousness and those which are not. But is it likely that every movement of the sand on the Sahara, every wave on the coasts of the northern shores of Australia, is associated with its own modification of someone’s consciousness? And, if not, we may argue against production, not merely from the principles of resemblance, but also from the principle of continuity.” (Pg. 95-96)

He says, “Inanimate material things perhaps are connected with a mind which animates the whole of so-called inanimate nature… [which] are then connected with mind only in the secondary sense in which my hand… is connected with mind. But I cannot see that there is even this secondary sense in which my hand, as opposed to my whole body, is connected with mind. But I cannot see that there is even this secondary reference to consciousness in the transactions of material things, such as the breaking of a tree by the wind. Nor can I see that mental events need to be completed in material events. Even if we suppose that consciousness occupies space in a sense at least analogous to that in which colors and temperatures do, need we suppose that the space is also occupied by extensive equalities?... In a word, I am not convinced that mentality needs to be completed in materiality, nor am I convinced that materiality needs to be completed in mentality. And, even if there is this logical connection, I do not see that it precludes a causal connection.” (Pg. 101)

He comments, “I am very far from clear as to what is meant by consciousness occupying the area of my body. Consciousness is not an extensive quality; it does not occupy space I the same sense as red does. And we must remember that I may be conscious of distant objects. But perhaps power of consciousness occupies the area of my body in the way that electrical and magnetic powers occupy the area of my body.” (Pg. 109)

He argues, “if …the Law of Causation is true, and … we are to blame for our acts, then each decision is due to an either infinite or world-long series of determinations of the will by the will… When you decide to take cocaine, your decision is caused by the ratio of your strong desire for its taste to your feeble desire to avoid its dangers; and your desires are caused partly by something in your environment---you see your packet of cocaine---but also partly by your past decisions to take cocaine. For your present strong desire is acquired and thus due to past decisions to take cocaine… it was in part due… to your character at the time that the cocaine was first offered to you. And is not your character at any given time, in part at least, determined by what you have done in the past?” (Pg. 123-124)

He says, “sense-facts, i.e. facts as to the sense-characters of sense-data, are LOGICALLY, and not merely CAUSALLY, mind-dependent. It is not merely that they come about because of minds, and thus WOULD not exist without minds. They contain minds and a mental relation, namely sensibly appearing, and thus COULD not exist without minds.” (Pg. 148)

He suggests, “we must avoid that error against which the Oxford logicians fought so long. This is the error of supposing that a proposition has a peculiar specific form of BEING, a form different from that of things on the one hand and of their states on the other, but not, I gather, entirely unlike that of universals. These peculiar things which have been called ‘asserta’ (as opposed to assertions, which are events), ‘meanings,’ ‘possibilities of assertion,’ float about out of time, wanting to be asserted. I want to persuade you that this view is unnecessary. I am convinced that in some way propositions are reducible to, though not necessarily identical with, things and the events which make up their life-histories.” (Pg. 197)

He summarizes, “I think it probable that every fact is either mental or material. But (i) this is not necessary. Hence it is not necessary that every mental fact should contain a material fact, even if it must contain a non-mental fact. (ii) It is not at present quite clear to me that there cannot be consciousness without consciousness of something, that is, that every mental fact is or contains a fact of the Form ‘X knows that S has P.’” (Pg. 207)

This book will be of keen interest to those studying analytical philosophy.