ISBN: Ostalo
Godina izdanja: ddd
Jezik: Engleski
Autor: Strani

The Making of Israel`s Army

Yigal Allon

manji format
engleski jezik
1971g
267 strana
Potpisi na 2 mesta, stranice malo požutele

Yigal Allon
Lieutenant General Yigal Allon was an Israeli military officer and politician.

This is the story of how the Jews, who had done without a national military force for over a millenium, developed a genuine army in the twentieth century. The Israel Defence Army was officially created on June 27, 1948. But its precursor had already been fighting a war for the previous six months. And its origins were even earlier.

As Allon explains, the first cells were formed as early as the 1880s. During the period between the World Wars, Arab pogroms led to the development of the Haganah. This army was founded in the 1920s, but began to acquire some skill with the arrival of Orde Wingate in the Levant in 1936. Wingate and Yitzhak Sadeh developed the Haganah into a force that turned the military situation around, so that the Arab attacks ground to a halt in 1939. Unfortunately, at that time, the Jews suffered a major diplomatic defeat. The British came up with the infamous White Paper which severly restricted Jewish immigration, and that put the Jews into a virtual war with Great Britain. In addition, the Jews faced threats from Germany and its allies as well as from Arabs. To counter all this, the Jews in 1941 formed an additional strike force, called the Palmach.

Allon describes how the new army trained and how decisions were made to avoid open warfare against Britain and also to avoid terrorist attacks on civilians. Instead, the focus was on illegal (according to the White Paper) immigration of Jews. This activity required planning and coordination: it required ground forces as well as ships. The author explains that this experience helped prepare Israel for its war of liberation, which began on November 30, 1947.

Allon then tells about the War of Liberation and the Sinai campaign of 1956. He explains that peace was averted after the 1956 war primarily due to the efforts of the United States, which forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai but did nothing to restrain the Arab side.

The author then explains the rationale in favor of Israel going to war against the Arabs in 1967 as a preventive measure. Allon successfully argued against this. As a result, Israel decided not to go to war unless its neighbors concentrated their forces in clear preparation for an attack or closed the Straits of Tiran (a clear declaration of war). Egypt did the latter, starting the Six Day War. Allon argued for an attack in May, before the Egyptians could organize their Sinai forces, but for political reasons, the strike was postponed until June.

The author points out that Israel was slow to attack Syria, with the result that Southern Syria remained in Syrian, not Israeli hands. Had Israel forced Syrian forces back to the outskirts of Damascus, the Israelis might have been able to link up with the Druze people and help them form their own buffer state.

The book concludes with over 150 pages of fascinating documents about the origin and early exploits of the Israeli forces.

If you are interested in this topic, I`m sure you will find this book very rewarding.